Berkeley argues for his idealism from the relativity of perception. He compares the size of a mite's foot as seen by the mite itself, by a human and by some smaller microorganism. What, exactly, is the argument? Is the argument successful? If not, how do we resist the sucking of all so-called primary qualities into the mind?
Berkeley has already proved that the "secondary qualities" (that is, heat, color, etc.) exist only in the mind, but while most philosophers stop here, Berkeley also wants to prove that primary qualities, such as extension, motion, etc., are also based purely off perception/the mind. Thus, Berkeley starts with the primary quality of extension, or size. He provides the example of a mite's foot, mentioning that it would appear teeny-weeny to a human but rather humongous to a microorganism. Because an object (in this case, the mite's foot) cannot be in two contradictory states at the same time, the quality of size, despite being considered primary, is still entirely dependent on the mind. Berkeley's argument, although seemingly smooth, has many holes. The premises are true: a mite's foot does look relatively large or small depending on perspective, and an object cannot be in two contradictory states at once. However, Berkeley's conclusion does not logically derive from this. It's all a matter of semantics. "Large" and "small" are in and of themselves subjective adjectives, and of course, they will exist purely in the mind because of their subjective nature. Contrarily, the size of an object is just that - the size of an object. It has nothing to do with what one thinks is big or small. So how do we resist the sucking of this primary quality into the mind? The answer is objective measurement. Units, like the meter, can be used to describe the size of an object without bringing in any subjectivity. If were to say a pencil was 19 cm. long, it would be 19 cm. long no matter what any individual perceived; the size of the object is inherent to it. Consequently, extension would be an independent quality that exists without the mind. This same methodology can be extended to other primary qualities. For instance: motion. We can use time and distance to describe motion in an objective matter (e.g. meters per second). This would also take the quality of motion out of the mind. Berkeley was trying to be quite sneaky here, using true premises to draw a false conclusion, but ultimately fails after close inspection.
ReplyDeleteBerkeley argues that traditionally “primary qualities”, like size and motion, are actually secondary qualities and only exists in the mind. In an attempt to prove so, he provides the following example with a mite. A mite’s foot appears extremely small from the perspective of humans, but extremely large to organisms smaller then the mite. Because something cannot be two different things at once (for example, something cannot be still and in motion at the same time), size is a secondary quality and is only perceived by the mind. However, this argument fails in one crucial way. Berkeley is trying to frame objective qualities in a subjective sense, and then calling them secondary qualities. Sure, a mite’s foot may be big/small depending on who is describing it. But a mite’s foot will always be “x” millimeters long no matter who you ask. If you take a measuring stick, and you give to a really small person, and Shaquille O’Neal, they will find the same measurement despite their difference in perspective. When we talk about size as a primary quality, we are talking about the objective descriptors. Berkeley is trying to reframe primary quality into something subjective, which means he is (not so subtly) dodging his actual burden of proof. Berkeley may defend his argument stating that a meter or a foot will be big or small depending on who you ask. He is still using the same method of phrasing objective qualities into subjective qualities, and then framing them as secondary qualities. The same logical fallacy still applies. We can resists sucking primary qualities into secondary qualities by avoiding the logic that Berkeley uses. Further, we can use a “foundationalists” approach to defend primary qualities. We know size can use the objective measurement of feet, meters, etc. As a result, motion must also be a primary quality, because it is just size/time, both of which are objective qualities. You don’t need human pleasure/pain to sense these size or time (unlike heat for example). However, I don’t think the burden of proof is on us as the readers. If Berkeley makes a claim, he needs to be able to justify it before we must refute it. It he can’t justify his claim that there are not primary qualities, there is no reason for us to prove independently that primary qualities exists.
ReplyDeleteBerkeley argues that size is a secondary quality. He argues that size, like color and heat, is subjective and cannot exist without the mind. He uses the example of a mite’s foot. He states that a mite might see its own foot as large, but a creature smaller than a mite would see the mite’s foot as far larger than the mite would. Similarly, a mite would see a human’s foot as massive, while a human would see a mite’s foot as miniscule. Berkeley uses these examples to argue that size is not objective and is merely a perception. If size were truly objective, how could something be large and small, two opposite things, at the same time? It would be impossible. A mite’s foot is large to something smaller than a mite and small to a human, but how can that be possible if size is objective? Again, it would be impossible. Therefore, size must be a secondary quality, one that exists only in the mind.
ReplyDeleteHowever, Berkeley’s argument is flawed. The parameters that Berkeley uses to judge size, largeness and smallness, are inherently subjective. Using these parameters, it would indeed be logical to conclude that size is subjective. However, since “large” and “small” are used to describe the sizes of things in relation to the sizes of other things, there are no objective definitions of what is large and what is small. So, anything can be large and small at the same time, depending on what it is compared to. What parameters, then, would be appropriate in judging an object’s size, and how can we avoid the sucking of all primary qualities into the mind? If one uses objective qualities, such as meters or feet, one sees that the size of an object is actually objective and exists with or without the mind. Regardless of if one perceives a mite’s foot as large or small, the foot always has the same length and volume. To a human, it is small, and to a creature smaller than a mite, it is large, but this does not mean that its size cannot be objective. To call something large or small is to compare it to something else, rather than to tell its objective size. To tell an object’s objective size, one should simply use the objective measurements we have already defined, like meters and feet. In this way, one sees that the size of an object does not depend on the mind.
Berkeley’s argument is one that applies to concepts that are subjective such as temperature, size, weight, beauty, pleasure, pain, etc. His argument is based off of the idea that something cannot be two opposite states at the same time. For example, the argument my group and I came up with in class about heat and cold: Since heat is a relative concept (something may appear hot in one instance and cold in another. If my left hand is placed in a bucket of ice, my right hand is placed in a bucket of scolding hot water, and then I place them both in a bucket of lukewarm water, the water will feel warm to my left hand, but cold to my right hand), and things cannot be in contradictory states at the same time, heat and cold are only present in the mind.
ReplyDeleteI believe that this is a very compelling argument. However, I believe that it is unsuccessful because it is important to consider who or what is the subject experiencing this subjective concept. For example, in the scenario discussed above, the left hand is not both hot and cold. The left hand is only experiencing one of these things: heat. So, the flaw I see in this argument is in the first premise: heat is relative. I don’t think it is in fact relative, because to my left hand, the water is only hot.
I think we can resist “primary qualities” being sucked into the mind by believing the following argument:
1. Within one object/person, things cannot exist in contradictory states.
2. Therefore, these states do not exist in the mind, and are in fact primary qualities.
To start the argument, Berkeley acknowledges that if size were materialistic, the size of something such as a mite's foot would be the same no matter what. It would be consistent to all that perceive it. Berkeley then notes that the size of a mite's foot seems normal to the mite, small to a human, and rather large to some smaller microorganism, and therefore the size is not the same. This realization means that rather than being a materialistic characteristic, size is based solely on the perceiver and only exists in said perceiver's mind. I do find this argument to be believable, as it is straightforward. In addition, this idea/argument is presented similarly to Berkeley's take on why color exists only in the mind (idealism) and is not a material substance (materialism), and the only difference is now Berkeley is taking the concept of something only existing in the mind on something like color, and applying it to grander ideas such as dimensions/size. In my opinion, size is not a primary quality, and therefore can be interpreted in this idealistic manner. A primary quality is something inherent, but I find a characteristic such as size to be more of a comparison characteristic than a qualitative number. There are many different ways to find qualitative size such as mass, height, weight, etc. To solve the issue of lacking comparable numbers in some instances, or lack of tools to find such numbers, humans have resorted to using words like "bigger" and "smaller." These words create a comparative aspect of size and therefore change size from something that can be a primary quality to a more secondary quality that changes person to person. Although the size of objects is never truly changing, the size is relative to each person, making it valid to apply the idealistic interpretation without worrying about other so-called primary qualities.
ReplyDeletePhilosophers in Berkeley’s time deemed extension, figure, solidity, gravity, motion, and rest to be primary or objective qualities, while subjective or secondary qualities included colors, sounds, and tastes. Berkeley postulated that size (or “extension”) was itself subjective, as a human would consider a mite’s foot to be tiny, while to tinier creatures a mite’s foot would appear massive. So, Berkeley maintains, “visible extension,” or size, is relative and not objective—because if it were objective, it could not exist in different states at the same time.
ReplyDeleteOne of the principal issues with Berkeley’s analysis is his definition of “visible extension” or “visible point,” by which Berkeley means “the smallest part of one’s visual field that one can discern.” (Adams 24, footnote 3). “He believed such an extension or part to be only finitely, not infinitesimally, small.” (Adams 24, footnote 3). Presumably, in his mite thought experiment, each organism’s visible extension would be different, such that the number of points that the object would make up would be different. But that is a fallacy, because size is based on an infinite number of points, regardless of perspective. Accordingly, that is not a basis upon which to deem size to be a secondary quality. In fact, what Berkeley is referring to is mass. And regardless of the perspective from which an object is viewed, it contains the same mass.
In some respects, however, Berkeley is on to something, although it would take Einstein’s theory of special relativity to bolster his claims. Einstein discovered that things thought to be unchanging constants in Newtonian classical mechanics were, in fact relative—for example, that events can occur at different times for different observers because mass warps the space-time continuum. So it is true that to different observers, how one experiences mass may be subjectively different depending on one’s inertial frame of reference. Einstein posited a difference between “invariant mass” that never varies, and “relativistic mass” that depends on the velocity of the observer.
So Einstein himself supports the notion that size is, in fact, subjective—but it is a subjectivity based not on the size of the observer, as Berkeley argues, but on the velocity of the observer. To that extent, size—or “extension,” as Berkeley would have it—is in fact a secondary quality. And so are many of the other things that philosophers and physicists in Berkeley’s time deemed to be unchanging primary qualities.
The argument that Berkeley presents is a response to the idea of a differentiation between so-called secondary and primary qualities. Secondary qualities are those that are entirely subjective like taste, smell, and color all of which are based in the mind. They are opposed to primary qualities like hardness, size, weight, which are supposedly inherent to an object. Berkeley responds to this idea by attempting to prove that primary qualities are subjective as well. He claims that a thing, which looks large to one being, would look small to another larger being and because no object can be both small and large at the same time, the concept of size must exist in one’s mind.
ReplyDeleteI think this argument is unsuccessful and actually, points to a way prove objectivity of some secondary qualities. While a mite may see, a foot as massive and a human would see one as small the foot is the same length in inches no matter what. By adding, a third party in the form of objective measurement we can effectively understand the objective size of something. Due to advances in science, this can also be used to measure things such as color by measuring the wavelength of the light, or smell by examining its component molecules. We may not be able to objectively say that a smell is good or bad as that is subjective (as Berkeley taught us with the pigs), however it is certain that we can tell if something smell of chocolate or not. Berkeley may retort that we cannot know if an inch is long or short because different beings perceive it differently. However, this would be shifting the goalpost of the discussion. An inch sets a verifiable metric for understanding the length of a given object and because an inch does not change (it is defined based off the physical rules of the universe) we can always find the size of something. We are therefore able to prove the ability to measure a primary quality, which means the physical world, can exist absent perception because while a mite might find a foot massive a foot is still 12 inches.
The argument that Berkeley is making about idealism is that everything we sense, particularly sight, is based entirely on the perception of the beholder. This argument is undisputable in my eyes, since he is technically correct: everything that one individual sees is completely different than what another individual sees. In making this argument, he also takes it to its biggest (or rather smallest) extreme by saying that a mite could see a regular person as imperceptibly massive, while to us a mite is miniscule. And yes, while we can acknowledge that this argument invalidates traditional views of "big" and "small", we can also acknowledge how this argument is invalidated by the existence of measurements. With measurements, everything in everyone's reality can become grounded in a solid, collective understanding. We can use these measurements to determine this primary quality, which creates a general outline for everyone to abide by. While a mite is millimeters long, to itself, its' foot is small, while a person's foot is massive. The argument still works, as our perceptions and opinions on what is "big" and "small" remain, however, size is concrete despite our perception of it. To conclude, our perception may deceive us, however concrete measurements will never.
ReplyDeleteBerkeley previously proves his belief in idealism by targeting “secondary qualities” (heat, color, etc.) strictly exist by the perception of the mind. He then attempts to forward his belief in idealism by tackling “primary qualities” (size, weight, etc.) as perceived by the mind. Berkeley uses his concept of an object only existing in the mind on dimensions and size. His argument about the mite’s foot essentially deals with everything being judged off of one’s perspective. This means that the mite’s foot could never be deemed a size because to a human the mite’s foot is small. However, to an insect or an animal smaller than the mite, the mite’s foot can be perceived as large. This forwards Berkeley’s argument that an objects’ size depends on perspective. His attempt to show the size of a mole’s foot from different perceptions is successful because he proves that size is judged by how we perceive it. If we are bigger than an animal, we perceive it as small. However, if there is an animal bigger than us humans, we would most likely perceive it as large. In my opinion, Berkeley pushes perception to be an essential part to decipher objects existing because of one’s mind rather than an object being a concrete material.
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